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Abstract
Constitutional dismemberment is one of the main con-
sequences attached to constitutional amendments that 
Albert’s book analyses. After having analyzed Albert’s 
definition, the present essay focuses on the practice of 
constitutional dismemberment via referendum and dis-
cusses whether, in times of populism and democratic 
decay, the constitutional design should provide for spe-
cific measures in order to protect the political opposition 
from the allegiance between the populist leadership and 
the majority of the population. Building on the existing 
literature and on a comparative analysis, the essay con-
cludes by highlighting the pros and cons of introducing 
special protections for political minorities during consti-
tutional referenda to protect democracy against populist 
deviations, suggesting the need to provide further stud-
ies in this field.
Keywords: constitutional amendments; referendum; 
Rule of Law; constitutional dismemberment; populism.
Resumo
O desmembramento constitucional é uma das principais 
consequências associadas às emendas constitucionais que 
o livro de Albert analisa. Depois de analisar a definição de 
Albert, o presente ensaio focaliza a prática do desmembra-
mento constitucional por referendo e discute se, em tempos 
de populismo e decadência democrática, o desenho cons-
titucional deve prever medidas específicas para proteger a 
oposição política da aliança entre a liderança populista e a 
maioria da população. Com base na literatura existente e 
em uma análise comparativa, o ensaio conclui destacando 
os prós e contras da introdução de proteções especiais para 
as minorias políticas durante os referendos constitucionais 
para proteger a democracia contra os desvios populistas, 
sugerindo a necessidade de fornecer mais estudos nesse 
campo.
Palavras-chave: emendas constitucionais; referendo; Esta-
do de Direito, desmembramento constitucional; populismo.
VALENTINA RITA SCOTTI
Rev. Investig. Const., Curitiba, vol. 7, n. 3, p. 795-811, set./dez. 2020.796 
CONTENTS
1. Constitutional dismemberment and populist referenda: is there a risk of democratic decay?; 2. Popu-
lism and Constitutional Change; 2.1 The Role of Political Opposition in Constitutional Dismemberment; 
3. Concluding remarks; 4. References.
1.  CONSTITUTIONAL DISMEMBERMENT AND POPULIST REFE-
RENDA: IS THERE A RISK OF DEMOCRATIC DECAY?
Albert’s notion of constitutional dismemberment1 introduces in the scholarship 
on constitutional change a category in between constitution-making and constitutio-
nal amendment, the former entailing the exercise of the constituent power while the 
latter encompassing a wide range of interventions on the fundamental Charter, from 
mere adjustments to revolutionary changes. With the constitutional dismemberment, 
therefore, Albert provides a denomination for those amendments implying a signifi-
cant transformative behavior, notwithstanding how many articles are formally ‘trans-
formed’, which constitutional aspects they discipline (i.e. constitution’s identity, catalog 
of fundamental rights, constitution’s central structural pillar), and whether the amend-
ments aim at disrupting or restoring the core of the Constitution. This transformation 
can occur suddenly or gradually, but it never breaks legal continuity and it is realized 
with all the relevant actors’ awareness about the impact it is going to have on one or 
more Constitution’s elemental parts. In brief, for Albert, a ‘simple’ amendment “must 
cohere with the existing constitution and must keep the constitution consistent with 
its pre-change form”,2 while a constitutional dismemberment, either enhancing or we-
akening democracy,3 does not.    
In times of populism, however, the impact of constitutional amendments on 
democracy should be carefully taken into account. Indeed, populism, magnifying the 
role of the will of the people, can jeopardize the Courts’ power to protect the essen-
tial elements of a constitution, and, enhancing the link between the leader and the 
population while weakening the one between the latter and its representatives in the 
Assemblies, can marginalize the political opposition, moreover when the procedure for 
constitutional dismemberment entails a referendum. 
1 ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendment and Dismemberment. Yale Journal of International Law, 
vol. 43, n. 1, 2018; ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional amendments: making, breaking, and changing consti-
tutions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019. passim.
2  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional amendments: making, breaking, and changing constitutions. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2019. p. 82. 
3  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional amendments: making, breaking, and changing constitutions. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2019. p. 78. 
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Entrenched in contemporary constitutionalism as a device for calling people to 
decide,4 the referendum has often been the tool for instating plebiscitarian democra-
cies.5 Indeed, referenda foster a majoritarian governance6 and populist leaders recur to 
them aware that individuals mostly prize charisma more than accurate explanations 
about the referendum’s real content7 because they lack technical competences for 
taking relevant political decisions8. Hence, although representative democracy is not 
immune from majoritarian derives,9 referenda are exploited for achieving majoritarian 
decision-making,10 moreover in a political environment with strong societal divides. 
In this regard, Albert states that the reason for establishing formal rules for cons-
titutional amendments is to reinforce the democratic debate,11 and that, because of its 
content, “the execution and legitimation of a constitutional dismemberment should 
require a greater degree of consent than a constitutional amendment”.12 To ensure such 
a greater degree, however, he relies on the existing features constitutional designers 
have proposed. At the state of the art, a ‘selective rigidity’ of the Constitution and/or the 
Courts’ power to strike down unconstitutional constitutional amendments have been 
entrenched in the Charters.13 However, the legal doctrine has already underscored the 
4  SUKSI, Marku. Bringing in the people: a comparison of constitutional forms and practices of the ref-
erendum. Leida: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993. p. 2. 
5  See DICEY, Albert Venn. Ought the referendum to be introduced into England. Contemporary Review, 
1890; DE BENOIST, Alain. Démocratie: le problème. Paris : Le Labyrinthe, 1985; MUELLER, Dennis C. Consti-
tutional Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996; MAYORGA, Rene Antonio. Outsider and Neopop-
ulism: the road to plebiscitary democracy. In: MAINWARING, Scott (Coord.). The Crisis of Democratic Rep-
resentation in the Andes. Redwood: Stanford University Press, 2006; QVORTRUP, Mads. Are Referendums 
Controlled and Pro-hegemonic? Political Studies, vol. 48, pp. 821-826, 2000.
6  See LIJPHART, Arend. Democracies. Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twen-
ty-One Countries. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984. p. 204. 
7  OAKESHOTT, Michael. Rationalism in Politics and other Essays. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1991. p. 380. 
See also TIERNEY, Stephen. Constitutional Referendums: The Theory and Practice of Republican Delibera-
tion. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. p. 28.
8  This is because whether the answer is relatively easy (YES or NO), the question may be complex, and there-
fore people’s perception of it can be maneuvered using the ideological bond between the people and political 
parties. See SARTORI, Giovanni. The Theory of Democracy Revisited. New York: Chatham House, 1987. p. 120, 
SETALA, Maija. On the problems of responsibility and accountability in referendums. European Journal of 
Political Research, n. 45, 2006. p. 699; SEMETKO, Holli A.; DE VREESE, Claes E. (Coord.). Political Campaigning 
in Referendums: Framing the Referendum Issue. London: Routledge, 2004.
9  TIERNEY, Stephen. Constitutional Referendums: The Theory and Practice of Republican Deliberation. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. p. 39-40. 
10  The risks for minorities deriving from referenda were already debated in MILL, John Stuart. Considerations 
on Representative Government [1862]. New York: Prometheus Books, 1991 and in MADISON, James. Feder-
alist Paper No 10.
11  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional amendments: making, breaking, and changing constitutions. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2019. p. 46. 
12  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional amendments: making, breaking, and changing constitutions. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2019. p. 92. 
13  LANDAU, David; DIXON, Rosalind. Constraining Constitutional Change. Wake Forest Law Review, vol. 50, 
n. 4, p. 859-890, 2015.
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potential weakness of these design mechanisms – as well as of the ‘militant democracy’ 
against current authoritarian threats – and has called for greater scholarly attention in 
analyzing the links between constitutionalism and democracy.14
Against this background, forms for protecting political minorities in times of de-
mocratic decay should not be underestimated among the tools for disciplining cons-
titutional change. Populism may indeed nullify the usually required parliamentary su-
per-majorities or the other devices at the parliamentary level thought for increasing 
the negotiation, given also the fact that most of the Constitutions require a smaller 
qualified majority if a referendum will follow. In this vein, Landau proposes to introdu-
ce the requirement of multiple votes and intervening elections between votes for the 
constitutional dismemberment believing that a bigger time span can reduce the risks 
of abusive constitutional practices. This paper discusses the feasibility of another tool. 
Building on the comparative study of cases in which populist forces abridged political 
opposition and achieved to weaken the Constitution’s democratic identity by calling 
for a popular referendum, here the introduction of an explicitly reserved quota for po-
litical opposition in the requested super-majority for the approval of the dismember-
ment is examined. 
2. POPULISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
Political scientists consistently struggle to find a definition of populism. For the 
scope of this contribution, populism can be defined as an ideology opposing the pure 
people against corrupted elite,15 with a specific communication style16 and a strategy 
for gaining and then keeping the power.17 In this strategy, populist parties exploit the 
promise, both right-wing and left-wing populism present with messianic tones and 
with a salvific attitude, to ensure the respect of the people’s real will for obtaining huge 
parliamentary majorities, then allowing them to monopolize the agenda-setting and 
the law-making process without needing to bargain with opposition parties. At this 
aim, constitutional change, either via constitution-making or constitutional dismem-
berment, is the most used tool.18 
When amendment procedures set for a referendum after a parliamentary 
approval with a minimum qualified majority, thanks to the super-majority they own, 
14  LANDAU, David. Abusive Constitutionalism. UC Davis Law Review, n. 47, p. 189-260, 2013.
15  MUDDE, Cas. The Populist Zeitgeist. Government and Opposition, n. 39, p. 541-543, 2004.
16  JAGERS, Jan; WALGRAVE, Stefaan. Populism as Political Communication Style: An Empirical Study of Politi-
cal Parties’ Discourse in Belgium. European Journal of Political Research, vol. 46, n. 3, p. 319–345, 2007.
17  WEYLAND, Kurt. Clarifying a Contested Concept – Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics. Journal 
of Comparative Politics, vol. 34, n. 1, p. 1-22, 2001.
18  LANDAU, David. Populist Constitutions. The University of Chicago Law Review, Chicago, vol. 85, n. 2, p. 
521-544, 2018.
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populist parties have thus a chance for proceeding to a constitutional dismemberment 
without consulting/negotiating with other actors. Should this happen, the judicial re-
view of constitutional amendments is the only remaining device for safeguarding the 
constitutional identity from unconstitutional amendments. Nevertheless, the doctrine 
has already underscored that only a few legal systems allow for this review, that some 
limit it to formal aspects and that a general critique can raise about the democracy of 
this procedure exactly because it safeguards constitutionalism at the expense of the 
respect of people’s will.19 Populists’ defiance toward Courts and notably toward consti-
tutional judges stems from this paradox. 
Furthermore, in a populist political environment, the main teleological aim of 
reinforced provisions for amending rigid constitutions – which is to preserve the funda-
mental Charter from volatile majorities and to include the opposition in such high-level 
decision-making – is generally disregarded as long as the focus is to fulfill the will of the 
present majority. Besides the risk of the tyranny of the (representative) majority, there 
is also the fact that the (popular) majority can be not so huge and, when a specific re-
quirement for the turnout is not provided, the outcome of the referendum can then be 
determined by the sole will of an active political minority.  
Finally, it should be noted that when the people’s will concerns elections, the 
implementation of the political program presented and the ‘evaluation’ people will pro-
vide in the subsequent elections represent an incentive for politicians for being realistic 
and accountable. A referendum, instead, is a one-time event with no-specific conse-
quences deriving from the way political forces campaigned, therefore they may have 
no incentives for being accountable and clearly represent/campaign on the content of 
the referendum. 
Notwithstanding whether people’s final decision has been in favor of or against 
populists’ expectations, several examples of opposition’s abridgment during attempts 
of constitutional dismemberment via referendum exist. Believing that the instability of 
constitution-making is the cost that must be paid when (re-)writing the Charter and 
that “the greater role granted to popular referenda and extra-parliamentary authori-
ties, the less constitutionalism matters as a political force”,20 the cases discussed below 
showcase the risks for the political opposition during constitutional dismemberments 
when devoted protection lacks. 
19  ROZNAI, Yaniv. Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.
20  HOLMES, Stephen T.; SUNSTEIN, Cass R. The Politics of Constitutional Revision in Eastern Europe. In: SAN-
FORD, Levinson (Coord.). Responding to imperfection: the theory and practice of Constitutional Amend-
ment. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995. p. 275-290.
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2.1. The role of political opposition in constitutional dismember-
ment
Albert hints at the use of referenda for circumventing the role of the opposition 
when examining the 1962 French referendum for amending the rules for presidential 
elections originally provided in the 1958 Constitution. On that occasion, De Gaulle 
convened a referendum (art. 11 Const.) and exploited his political influence on the po-
pulation for having the direct election approved, aware that he could not gather the 
required majority in Parliament. 
Several other cases in which the relationship between the leader and the popu-
lation has been exploited for constitutional changes, often entailing a clear constitu-
tional dismemberment, can be listed. As Albert briefly mentions, Turkey is among the 
countries where constitutional dismemberment can be observed;21 also, it is a country 
where the abridgment of the political opposition via referendum proved successful 
due to a solid pro-hegemonic dynamic of popular consultations.22 Indeed, Albert re-
ports the case of the 2017 constitutional amendment, having entailed the rewriting 
or repealing of around 40 percent of the 1982 Charter. The reform, which builds on the 
2007 constitutional amendment introducing the direct election of the President of the 
Republic, has changed the form of government from parliamentarism to a presidentia-
lism turning the country into a majoritarian democracy and extensively increasing the 
power of the President of the Republic.23 In both the 2007 and 2017 amendments, the 
modifications of the form of government needed the popular confirmation via refe-
rendum and impinged on the constitution’s identity to an extent that let include them 
among constitutional dismemberments. In both the 2007 and 2017 amendments, in-
cumbents proved aware of this. 
Nevertheless, in 2007, the referendum was convened in a residual attempt of 
avoiding dismemberment, while in 2017 it was a means for ensuring people’s support 
to the change of the constitutional identity while abridging the parliamentary oppo-
sition. Indeed, in 2007, President Sezer convened the referendum in order to hamper 
the entry into force of the constitutional amendment for the direct election of the 
President of the Republic the AKP majority in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey 
(GNAT) approved – although not with the required majority for avoiding the referen-
dum – when the CHP opposition proved able to obstruct the election of Abdullah Gül 
as the President of the Republic. In the letter explaining the reasons for sending back to 
21  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional amendments: making, breaking, and changing constitutions. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2019. p. 85. 
22  In this regard, it is worthy to underscore that Turks have always confirmed, though with different majorities, 
constitutional amendments proposed by the AKP government. 
23  SCOTTI, Valentina Rita. On the pro-hegemonic nature of referenda for constitutional reforms in Turkey. A 
focus on 16 April 2017 referendum introducing presidentialism. Osservatorio Costituzionale, n. 2, 2017.
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the GNAT the amendment bill for reconsideration, President Sezer stated that the direct 
election would have altered the pillars of parliamentarism, and namely the impartia-
lity of the office, on which the Republic was built since its establishment.24 Although 
envisaging the risks, Sezer could only rely on the people, who however confirmed the 
pro-hegemonic nature of referenda and approved the dismemberment. In 2017, ins-
tead, the President of the Republic Erdoğan convened the referendum because the 
amendment bill obtained only 330 votes, lacking the 367 votes on 550 needed for di-
rect entry into force (article 175 of the Constitution). The populist antagonism between 
the people and the elite, as well as the lack of a political culture based on pluralism, 
clearly appeared in this circumstance. Indeed, Erdoğan stated that “These people (the 
opposition) don’t have respect for the people or popular sovereignty. Remember the 
slogan: one people, one flag, one homeland, one state”.25 The opposition surrendered 
to the leader/people relationship and the leader of the opposition party CHP, Kemal 
Kılıçdaroğlu, while explaining the decision of not appealing the Constitutional Court,26 
stated that “A sovereignty that cannot be protected by the people’s will is not possible 
to be protected by any other power. […] If the issue is the nation’s sovereignty, the 
real Supreme Court in that case is the people’s, nation’s court”.27 The peculiar political 
atmosphere of the post-July-2016 state of emergency – still into force at the time of the 
referendum – contributes to explaining this submissive approach. 
Finally, it is important to underscore that the demotion of the political oppo-
sition during constitutional amendments’ negotiations, though increased during the 
AKP era, was in the intent of the framers of an amendment passed at the end of the 
’80s. Indeed, in the original 1982 Constitution, a two-thirds majority of the MPs in the 
GNAT should approve amendment proposals, the President of the Republic is entitled 
to return the amendment bill for reconsideration, and, in case it is re-adopted without 
change, he can submit it to a popular referendum (article 175).28 However, in 1987, be-
lieving this procedure too rigid and unable to overcome parliamentary deadlocks, the 
Prime Minister Turgut Özal supported the approval of a constitutional amendment on 
24  For further details on the introduction of the direct election, see ÖRÜCÜ, Esin. Whither the Presidency of 
the Republic of Turkey? European Public Law, n. 14, p. 35-53, 2008. p. 48.
25  ERDOĞAN, Recep Tayyip. Yenikapı’da tarihi bulus¸mada tarihi mesajlar. Sabah, April 8, 2017. 
26  It is noteworthy that, whether appealed, the Constitutional Court could have declared the amendment 
unconstitutional. However, it should be also noted that the Court has progressively reduced its activism in 
this regard since the 2010 constitutional amendment having overloaded the Constitutional Court with the 
introduction of individual applications for rights violation and increased the number of judges elected thanks 
to the allegiance with the AKP environment.
27  Main opposition CHP won’t appeal the presidential system reform before Turkey’s top court, in Daily Sa-
bah, 14 February 2017. 
28  Ozbudun states that “This was in line with the Constitution’s general philosophy of strengthening the 
Presidency as an ‘impartial arbiter’.”, in ÖZBUDUN, Ergun. The Constitutional System of Turkey: 1876 to the 
Present. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2011. 
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constitutional revisions according to which, should the amendment bill be adopted by 
at least three-fifths but less than two-thirds majority of MPs and if it is not returned by 
the President for reconsideration, the amendment shall be submitted to a mandatory 
popular referendum. If it is returned for reconsideration but is re-approved by a two-
thirds majority, then the President may discretionally decide whether to submit the bill 
to a referendum. 
Özal’s will was to avoid that opposition’s obstructionism could hamper the ap-
proval of an amendment. The reform of the form of government perfectly fitted the 
matter. Initially, the Constitutional Commission for Reconciliation was established for 
having the reform of the 1982 Constitution negotiated in a pluralistic way. Neverthe-
less, when presidentialism emerged has an AKP’s priority and the opposition highly 
contested its introduction, negotiations were put aside and the parliamentary majority 
plus referendum was considered a valid and viable procedure as well. 
It is finally noteworthy that opposition’s abridgment has occurred, though more 
subtly, also when unamendable provisions were questioned.29 Indeed, when the Con-
stitutional Court declared the unconstitutionality of the amendment bill reforming 
articles 10 and 42 of the Constitution for allowing female students to wear the veil be-
cause it infringed Turkish secularism,30 the Executive apparently respected the judicial 
decision, but then de facto overruled it through legislative or administrative measures 
it could approve without having to follow the procedure and the rules for a formal 
amendment.
The use of referendum for constitutional dismemberment to circumvent the op-
position is evident also in the 2009 amendment to the 1999 Constitution of Venezuela 
the then populist President Hugo Chavez promoted for abolishing the term limit for all 
elected offices.31 This amendment strongly altered an element of the Venezuelan con-
stitutional identity established since the 1830 Constitution32 and confirmed in the 1999 
Charter. To appreciate the democratic backsliding connected to this amendment, it 
should be introduced a premise on the procedures 1999 Constitution provided. Indeed, 
29  According to art. 4 of 1982 Turkish Constitution, the republican nature of the state (article 1), the main 
characteristics of the Republic listed in article 2 (democracy, secularism, social State governed by the rule of 
law, public peace, national solidarity, and justice; human rights’ respect; Atatürk’s nationalism), the integrity of 
the State, its official Language, flag, national anthem and Capital (article 3) cannot be amended. 
30  Constitutional Court, E2008/16 K2008/116, 5 June 2008. On the importance of this decision for the adjudi-
cation of unconstitutional constitutional amendments in the Turkish legal system, see ROZNAI Yaniv; YOLCU, 
Serkan. An unconstitutional constitutional amendment-The Turkish perspective: A comment on the Turkish 
Constitutional Court′s headscarf decision. International Journal of Constitutional Law, vol. 10, n. 1, p. 175-
202, 2012.
31  The referendum was proposed after the rejection of another referendum on a constitutional amendment 
aimed at removing the term limit only for the presidential office, held in December 2007. 
32  The only exceptions in this regard were the 1857 Constitution, the authoritarian Constitutions approved 
under Juan Vicente Gómez (1914-1933), and the 1953 Constitution of Marcos Pérez Jiménez. 
Constitutional dismemberment via referenda: a comparative overview
Rev. Investig. Const., Curitiba, vol. 7, n. 3, p. 795-811, set./dez. 2020. 803
the Charter distinguished between changes safeguarding its fundamental principles or 
structure – to be realized through a constitutional amendment procedure (article 340) 
or a constitutional reform procedure (article 342), both entailing a referendum – and 
the alterations of the fundamental structure, to be realized through a National Constit-
uent Assembly (article 347); finally, should a constitutional reform be rejected, a similar 
proposal cannot be filed again before the National Assembly in the remainder of the 
constitutional term (article 345). However, there is no provision on the rejection of con-
stitutional amendments or on the possibility to file the same rejected constitutional 
reform proposal through the procedure of a constitutional amendment. 
Thus, when Chavez proposed the amendment, which extended to all the electi-
ve offices the term limit removal he already attempted only for the Presidency in 2007, 
the political opposition strongly claimed that this would have meant a final consecra-
tion of authoritarianism in the country and underscored the risks of unconstitutionality 
connected to procedures. Nevertheless, confirming the potential subservience courts 
may suffer in populist divided political societies, despite the massive opposition of non-
-governing political forces, the Constitutional Court declared both that the proposal 
had to be conceived as a constitutional amendment and that the limits provided for 
the constitutional reform could not apply.33 In this case, the allegiance between the 
Executive and the Court deprived of relevance the Assembly and the role the opposi-
tion should have therein moreover when discussing constitutional dismemberments. 
Among Latin America delegative democracies,34 several other examples of re-
ferenda used for circumventing the opposition in a constitutional dismemberment 
can be found. Ecuador is a relevant case. There, President Correa exploited the popu-
list discourse for defeating the opposition – including the one arising from his own 
party – and bound the Parliament to his will. Then, in 2011, after the 2010 failed coup 
that narrows the psychological environment in which the Ecuadorian referendum was 
approved to the 2017 Turkish one, Correa asked people to approve several measures, 
among the others, for packing the Supreme Court and reducing freedom of the press. 
The 2008 Constitution of Ecuador establishes two procedures for constitutional amend-
ments not entailing structural changes or alterations in the protection of rights and it is 
the Constitutional Court that indicated the procedure to be followed; the Charter also 
entitles the President with the power of initiative and of convening referenda for cons-
titutional amendments (articles 441-442).35 Finally, a procedure exists for installing, via 
referendum, a Constituent Assembly for replacing the Charter (article 443). In the lack 
of a provision for a constitutional dismemberment and thanks to the subservience of 
33  See Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice, decision no. 53, 3 February 2009.  
34  O’DONNELL, Guillermo. Delegative Democracy. Journal of Democracy, vol. 5, p. 55-69, 1994.
35  See Ley Orgánica de Garantías Jurisdiccionales y Control Constitucional. 
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the Constitutional Court,36 Correa could use the majority in Parliament and the popular 
support for strongly empowering the Executive against the other state powers and for 
reducing fundamental freedoms’ protection. 
The modification of the presidential term, namely its extension as a step toward 
illiberal governments, has been the main reason for convening constitutional referen-
da in Sub-Saharan Africa. Hence, in light of the risks for the endurance of democracy, 
the experience of Guinea seems relevant. Indeed, in 2001, a referendum was held for 
extending the presidential term from 5 to 7 years, allowing the incumbent President to 
serve for a third term, and extending the central government’s power on local authori-
ties. The case is noteworthy because, although it proved quite fragmented, the opposi-
tion unitedly supported the claim of the Speaker of the National Assembly, El Hadj Bub-
acarr Biro Diallo, for a stronger involvement of the Assembly in drafting constitutional 
changes. The conflict among state powers can be considered as the main reason for 
the Executive’s failure in obtaining the required parliamentary majority of two-thirds of 
MPs, which then made necessary the referendum. Although the opposition called for 
a boycott, the population confirmed the allegiance with the leader and approved the 
amendment, which entailed a dismemberment for its consequences on the potential 
alternation in the highest office. President Conte’s death in 2008 opened a period of 
turmoil terminated with the approval via referendum of the 2010 Constitution, again 
establishing presidential term in 5 years. However, with March 2020 referendum, once 
again the population sided the leader and approved the extension of the presidential 
term (from 5 to 6 years), together with several amendments reinforcing the prohibition 
of gender-based discrimination and violence. In this case, the democratic decay can 
be a more than evident menace, the incumbent 80-years-old President Alpha Condè 
having clarified well before the referendum that the terms he already served under the 
previous constitutional limit in his opinion do not count. In brief, having approved the 
referendum, Guineans have almost ensured him 12 further years in office. 
Looking at Europe, the 2016 Italian referendum is a noteworthy case of consti-
tutional dismemberment that challenged the role of the opposition. It certainly repre-
sented an attempt of dismemberment for the modifications to the perfect bicameral-
ism framers entrenched in the Charter to ensure meditated decisions. Italy is among 
the countries providing for a single procedure for all the possible constitutional chang-
es, though multiple votes are required. Notably, each House of the Parliament must 
approve the constitutional amendment in two successive debates, held with intervals 
of not less than three months. On the second vote, both Houses must approve by an 
absolute majority and, if it is with less than a two-thirds majority in each of the Houses 
36  In the case under examination, the Court established that the bill had to undergo the procedure for the 
consulta popular (see Constitutional Court of Ecuador, Rulings no. 001-11-DRC-CC and 001-DCP-CC-2011, 15 
February 2011). 
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on the second vote, the amendment may be subject to a referendum if either one-fifth 
of the MPs in each House or 500,000 voters or five regional councils so requests (article 
138). In brief, the Italian Constitution seems to provide a means for the opposition to 
contrast an Executive-initiated constitutional amendment, as indeed occurred with the 
2006 wide reform of Title V of the Constitution devolving some powers to local entities. 
In the case of the 2016 referendum, however, both the right-wing opposition and a part 
of the ruling center-left party disliked the constitutional amendment bill the Executive 
proposed, up to the point that it was necessary to put the question of confidence to 
have it approved on the second vote. Putting the question of confidence on a consti-
tutional amendment is a clear sign of the Executive’s attempt to reduce the margins of 
negotiation on the reform of a core constitutional element. The decision of some MPs 
of the majority-coalition who voted in favor of the reform to request a referendum does 
not seem a viable tool for restoring the democratic breach and can also denounce an 
attempt to pass with the popular support a reform scarcely appreciated by people’s 
representative. In the end, the referendum was not approved, probably also because 
of the personalization of the campaign the then Prime Minister Matteo Renzi made.37  
3. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Albert has developed the theory of dismemberment to answer the following 
questions: How should constitutional designers structure the rules of constitutional 
change? How may political actors legally and legitimately formalize transformative 
changes to the constitution? How should scholars evaluate constitutional changes be-
lieved to violate the constitution’s rights, structure, or identity? Should courts review 
the constitutionality of constitutional alterations?
Dealing with these questions, the present contribution attributed a specific role 
to referenda held in populist regimes, willing to study whether the constitutional de-
sign currently available can avoid the abridgment of the opposition, and the democ-
racy backsliding it entails, moreover when the constitutional amendment in reality 
is a dismemberment. In this vein, the risks for democracy during constitution-mak-
ing processes have not been explored, although it is questioned whether also in this 
case the lack of safeguard clauses can endanger democracy, as proved in the recent 
Hungarian experience.38 Similarly, the strength of constitutional rigidity, even in those 
constitutions having provided procedures nuanced according to the relevance of the 
amendment for the general coherence of the Charter itself, has not been examined. 
37  For details on this, see BULL, Martin J. Renzi Removed. The 2016 Italian Constitutional Referendum and Its 
Outcome. Italian Politics, n. 1, pp. 131-153, 2017.
38  BÁNKUTİ, Miklós; HALMAI, Gàbor; SCHEPPELE, Kim Lane. Hungary’s Illiberal Turn: Disabling the Constituti-
on.  Journal of Democracy, vol. 23, n. 3, p. 138–46, 2012.
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Here, the focus is on the risks the absence of clauses explicitly protecting the political 
opposition can entail for the general endurance of democracy. Indeed, once clarified 
that the constitution-making process matters as well as the final content of the Charter 
and that this process must be inclusive, participatory, and open,39 then the same shall 
be valid for constitutional amendments, moreover when they touch the core of the 
constitution’s identity. 
According to Albert, a constitutional change should not be barred by the Consti-
tution, but it also cannot go beyond the power of lawmakers and the people. Therefore, 
even though a transformative constitutional amendment should be allowed without 
taking the risk of the instability connected with a new constitution-making process, 
dismemberments should not occur by using the simple procedures for constitutional 
amendment. As Albert states, dismemberments “demand a higher level of direct or me-
diated popular consent since their effect is to unmake the constitution. […] All changes 
should be possible without breaking legal continuity but not without gathering a high-
er-than-ordinary quantum of agreement from the peoples and institutions needed to 
legitimate transformative changes”. In brief, “What validates a formal amendment is not 
its content alone but also the process by which it comes into existence”. Though this 
clarifies that the procedure matters and that a special procedure should be introduced 
for constitutional dismemberments, yet it relies upon the current constitutional design 
believing that super-majorities and referendum can safeguard the respect of the dem-
ocratic game. 
Nevertheless, when populism enters in such a game, the issue complicates. 
Indeed, because “a two-thirds supermajority requirement, which may seem very de-
manding in the context of a competitive two-party or multiparty democracy, may not 
be demanding at all in a dominant party system or even after one party (as in Hungary) 
happens to win a high percentage of seats with a bare majority of votes”,40 the possibili-
ty of providing clauses for protecting the opinion of the minorities should be discussed. 
In other words, what is at stake here is the risk that populist forces, having already ob-
tained a supermajority in the Parliament, exploit the popular favor they enjoy for a con-
stitutional dismemberment toward a less democratic constitutional identity, able to se-
cure their power and hampering the turnover. Attributing solely to the judicial review 
of constitutional amendments the power of protecting the system from the violation of 
the democratic rules seems neither viable nor realistic, given the cases – some of them 
also mentioned here – in which Courts, willing or not, have sided populist Executives. 
39  See HART, Vivien. Democratic Constitution-Making. US Institute of Peace-Special Report n. 107, 2003. 
And CHAMBERS, Simone. Democracy, Popular Sovereignty, and Constitutional Legitimacy. Constellations – 
An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory, vol. 11, issue 2, p. 153-173, 2004. 
40  LANDAU, David; DIXON, Rosalind. Constraining Constitutional Change. Wake Forest Law Review, vol. 50, 
n. 4, p. 859-890, 2015. p. 872.
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In times of populism, also the referendum fails to represent a solid device for 
protecting democracy because it seems to glorify – instead of containing – its main fea-
ture, that is majoritarianism, ignoring that the protection of political minorities is quint-
essential to democracy.  Indeed, involving people’s participation in the procedures for 
constitutional amendment has been deemed as obvious41 because it seems to add a 
taste of constituent power, in line with Seyes’ conception that the nation’s will is always 
legal.42 Nevertheless, the nation’s will can be volatile and, moreover when facing an 
economic or social crisis, people may incline to sacrifice freedom and democracy in 
favor of political stability. Furthermore, considering the aforementioned characteristics 
of the referendum, asking about people’s will can be tricky during populisms both in 
case of constitution-making – when a mandate from people is necessary43 – and of 
constitutional dismemberment, a fortiori whether the latter de facto means drafting a 
new Charter but following preordered procedures, as occurs in several Latin American 
countries including those mentioned here. 
The examined cases instantiate the risks for political oppositions, showing that 
different constitutional designs could not safeguard them against populist forces. Inde-
ed, in Turkey, where the Constitution provides a single procedure for every kind of cons-
titutional amendment, lists a series of unamendable principles and assigns the Court an 
overlooking power, the procedure itself suggests the pathways for circumventing the 
opposition. In Venezuela and Ecuador, instead, the existence of different procedures ac-
cording to the relevance of the constitutional change was not sufficient for protecting 
the opposition, because of the alliance between the leader and the judiciary. Guinea 
instantiates that constitutional provisions can always be hostages of a strong leader/
people relationship. In Italy, finally, the procedure conforms to Landau’s request of mul-
tiple votes for a meditated decision, but the absence of an explicit provision prohibiting 
the vote of confidence on constitutional matters – and possibly the lack of a political 
sensibility for understanding that such decisions should be inclusive and open – cons-
trained the debate and coerced the parliamentary vote.  
Under a propositional perspective, these cases lead to a reflection and a re-
quest. The reflection is that democracy is for sure a constantly on-going process and 
that, though framers have tried their best, not always the tools provided in the consti-
tuent moment can foresee the challenges a legal system will have to face. Furthermore, 
the impact of populism on democracy should be analyzed both with reference to the 
41  See, i.e., EISENSTADT, Todd A.; LEVAN, Carl A.; MABOUDI, Tofigh. When Talk Trumps Text: The Democratizing 
Effects of Deliberation during Constitution-making, 1974-2011. American Political Science Review, vol. 109, 
n. 4, p. 592-612, 2015.
42  SİEYÈS, Emmanuel-Joseph. What is the Third Estate? (Qu’est-ce que le Tiers Etat ?). London: Praeger, 
1963.
43 ACKERMAN, Bruce. The future of liberal revolution. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991. p. 53-54. 
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exploitation of the democratic procedure it may realize, and having regard to its impact 
on aspects such as the freedom of the press and the fairness of the political campaign, 
which can further reduce people’s ability to stand for democracy. Indeed, scholars have 
already demonstrated the impact of a lively and free civil society on the outcomes of 
referenda as well as the disruptive effects the governmental control on the public sphe-
re may have in this regard.44 Nevertheless, experience has also proved that the main 
characteristic of populism is to limit the public confrontation by assuming the will of 
the majority supporting it as the will of the whole population, or at least of the only part 
of the population worthy to be considered.  
These premises led to the request to deepen the studies on the role of the politi-
cal opposition during constitutional dismemberment and to examine whether introdu-
cing new devices, such as the protection of political minorities, can harbor the demo-
cratic principle. Notably, about the potential constitutional design whose importance 
Albert underlines moreover with regard to constitutional dismemberment, it should be 
questioned whether it can be significant to keep the already provided majorities and 
super-majorities, joint with referenda, but introducing a reserved quota of opposition’s 
approval for those amendments entailing a dismemberment. It can be anticipated that, 
although such a quota can be easily introduced in bipolar systems, it could be more 
difficult to ensure in proportional political realities. Furthermore, besides constitutional 
provisions, the official role a legal system assigns to political minorities calls into ques-
tion the parliamentary rules of procedures; therefore, in the light of ensuring special 
protection to these groups during constitutional change, amendments and dismem-
berments, the statute of the opposition should be further studied and intertwined with 
the theory on constitutional change. At this stage of the research, however, the reser-
ved quota seems to be a viable device for protecting democracy against the populist 
authoritarian drift, as long as it will compulsorily entail the duty of canvassing different 
opinions. 
The aim of avoiding opposition’s obstructionism, which had justified the 
amendment of article 165 of the Turkish Constitution, can be accepted with regard to 
the enactment of the political program the people awarded with their vote during elec-
tions. Yet, when fundamental constitutional tenets are endangered by a constitutional 
dismemberment the deliberation should be as inclusive as possible. Thence, even as-
suming that in some legal system the introduction of a quota would not be feasible, a 
guarantee for the deliberation – meant as a moment in which all the involved parties 
are heard and conflicting arguments are smooth out – should stem, avoiding coercion 
as in the aforementioned Italian question of confidence.   
44  CHAMBERS, Simone. Democracy and constitutional reform: Deliberative versus populist constitutionalism. 
Philosophy and Social Criticism, vol. 45, n. 9-10, p. 1116-1131, 2019.
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